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ABSTRACT
The crisis generated by the emergence and pandemic spread of COVID-19 has thrown into the global spotlight the
dangers associated with novel diseases, as well as the key role of animals, especially wild animals, as potential sources
of pathogens to humans. There is a widespread demand for a new relationship with wild and domestic animals,
including suggested bans on hunting, wildlife trade, wet markets or consumption of wild animals. However, such
policies risk ignoring essential elements of the problem as well as alienating and increasing hardship for local
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communities across the world, and might be unachievable at scale. There is thus a need for a more complex package
of policy and practical responses. We undertook a solution scan to identify and collate 161 possible options for
reducing the risks of further epidemic disease transmission from animals to humans, including potential further
SARS-CoV-2 transmission (original or variants). We include all categories of animals in our responses
(i.e. wildlife, captive, unmanaged/feral and domestic livestock and pets) and focus on pathogens (especially viruses)
that, once transmitted from animals to humans, could acquire epidemic potential through high rates of human-to-
human transmission. This excludes measures to prevent well-known zoonotic diseases, such as rabies, that cannot
readily transmit between humans. We focused solutions on societal measures, excluding the development of vac-
cines and other preventive therapeutic medicine and veterinary medicine options that are discussed elsewhere.
We derived our solutions through reading the scientific literature, NGO position papers, and industry guidelines,
collating our own experiences, and consulting experts in different fields. Herein, we review the major zoonotic trans-
mission pathways and present an extensive list of options. The potential solutions are organised according to the key
stages of the trade chain and encompass solutions that can be applied at the local, regional and international scales.
This is a set of options targeted at practitioners and policy makers to encourage careful examination of possible
courses of action, validating their impact and documenting outcomes.
Key words: emerging infectious disease, zoonotic risk, zoonotic spillover, SARS-CoV-2, coronavirus, pandemic preven-
tion, wildlife trade
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I. INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic has alerted the world to the
risks of emerging diseases of zoonotic origin and has
prompted widespread concern and interest in acting to
prevent future similar pandemics. Many solutions have
been proposed, in particular related to complete bans of
wildlife trade and wildlife markets, but such solutions are
considered impractical by some and, if implemented,
could cause major socio-economic shocks and food insecu-
rity (Booth et al., 2021) and would only cover part of the
problem. Thus, more holistic solutions should be exam-
ined to understand additional mechanisms that could
drive spillover from other animals to humans. There is a
need for larger scale rethinking of the means of reducing
risk for emerging diseases that could spill over from ani-
mals into humans, and especially those diseases that could
spread rapidly due to high transmission rates from human
to human (Dobson et al., 2020; Morens, Daszak &
Taubenberger, 2020).
Herein we (i) review the risks posed by different transmis-
sion pathways for zoonotic disease spillover, and (ii) use solu-
tion scanning as a methodological approach to consider and
collate the possible options for reducing these risks. We also
identify important outstanding questions and pragmatic
approaches for the future.
Solution scanning, which involves listing all the known
options for addressing a particular problem, represents a
more transparent and rigorous strategy for assessing pos-
sible policy options than the traditional approach of
selecting a subjective subset of policies from a combina-
tion of the experience and beliefs of practitioners and pol-
iticians (Sutherland et al., 2014). While a complete review
of the evidence base for all available policy options would
be preferable, especially for complex policy problems
where outcomes may be location or context specific, the
scale and duration of such reviews are often impractical.
Solution scanning can be a valuable first step in this
decision-making process, by creating a comprehensive
and transparent basis for subsequent assessment of evi-
dence, effectiveness and contextualised considerations
for the practical implementation of different options
(Sutherland et al., 2014; Sutherland & Burgmann, 2015).
This approach has been used successfully for a range of
topics including agro-forestry, options for the conserva-
tion of marine biodiversity, and sustainable intensifica-
tion of agricultural practices or place-based food
networks (Jacquet et al., 2011; Hernandez-Morcillo
et al., 2018; Plieninger et al., 2018; Dicks et al., 2019).
Solution scanning is also the first stage of subject-wide
evidence synthesis, for example to assess the effectiveness
of biodiversity conservation interventions (Sutherland
et al., 2019).
II. MAJOR TRANSMISSION PATHWAYS FOR
ZOONOTIC DISEASE TRANSFER
(1) Importance of zoonotic pathogens, including
COVID-19
The pandemic potential of zoonotic pathogens is strictly
linked to their ability to generate sustained human-to-human
transmissibility. This is the case with SARS-CoV-2 (the virus
responsible for COVID-19) which caused a global pandemic
affecting over 200 countries and territories in under 100 days
and resulting in over 175 million known infections and
3811561 assigned human deaths by 15th June 2021 [WHO
Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard covid19.
who.int]. Although there is debate about its exact source
and infection pathway, COVID-19 appears to have been
the result of zoonotic transmission from an original wildlife
host, possibly via an intermediate animal host, following close
contact with people (Andersen et al., 2020; Wu et al., 2020).
While the direct reservoir of SARS-CoV-2 might never be
identified, it is clear that close proximity of different wild
and domestic animal species in a wildlife market setting (often
conflated with ‘wet market’, which may, or may not, have
wildlife and simply refers to the existence of fresh produce)
may enable recombination between more distant corona-
viruses and the emergence of recombinants with novel phe-
notypes (Li et al., 2020). This is particularly relevant given
that multiple relatives of SARS-CoV-2 and SARS-CoV
(the cause of the 2003 SARS epidemic) circulate in wildlife
species in Southeast Asia and southern China (Zhou
et al., 2021). Preventing such situations as well as reducing
direct human contact with wild animals appears critical for
preventing new coronavirus zoonoses.
Several other major recent pandemic and epidemic dis-
ease outbreaks have zoonotic origins including HIV-AIDS,
Ebola and SARS (Wang & Eaton, 2007; Allen et al., 2017);
60% of human emerging disease events are caused by zoo-
notic pathogens, with most (72%) originating in wildlife
(Jones et al., 2008). Furthermore, most known human patho-
gens are zoonotic (80% of viruses, 50% of bacteria, 40% of
fungi, 70% of protozoa and 95% of helminths) (Taylor,
Latham &Woolhouse, 2001). Although most zoonotic path-
ogens are not capable of sustained human-to-human trans-
mission, some can cause major disease outbreaks; thus,
preventing the transfer of pathogens from other animal spe-
cies into humans is a key societal challenge. Predicting and
reducing the risk of such outbreaks is imperative if we are
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to avoid future detrimental impacts on human health and the
global economy, such as those caused by the COVID-19
pandemic.
(2) Disease transfer pathways
Transfer of pathogens from animals to humans can occur
through diverse pathways involving interactions with free-
living or captive wildlife, livestock or other domesticated ani-
mals (Table 1; Fig. 1). It is important to note that, in practice,
the distinctions between these categories of animals are often
poorly understood and category differentiation may be
imprecise but differences have significant implications for
exposure to various pathogens.
The rate of zoonotic pathogen emergence is increasing
globally, and human population density is a strong predictor
of emerging disease events (Jones et al., 2008), indicating that
pathogen emergence is driven by human-induced changes
bringing wildlife, livestock and humans into closer and
more frequent contact (Morse et al., 2012). The risk of disease
transmission depends on both intrinsic factors (e.g. pathogen
life history, host availability and immunity and transmission
route) and external factors (e.g. land-use, human population
changes, socio-economic provisions) such that the nature of
risks varies among locations and over time (Becker
et al., 2020), and influences both the probability of pathogen
transmission from animal to human, and the probability of
an infected person developing the disease (Han, Kramer &
Drake, 2016).
The spillover of a pathogen from animals requires a series
of stages, including the reservoir host being at sufficient den-
sity to retain the pathogen, pathogen release, human expo-
sure to the pathogen, and the pathogen overcoming
structural barriers, innate immune responses and molecular
compatibility (Plowright et al., 2017). The global connectivity
of human society greatly increases the movement of humans,
disease vectors (Tatem, Hay & Rogers, 2006) and various
pathogen-infected animals (Can, D’Cruze & Macdonald,
2019), magnifying the likelihood of the spillover and spread
of a pathogen, particularly in areas of high human popula-
tion size and density.
(3) Disease transfer involving wild animals
Most emerging infectious diseases are thought to have origi-
nated in wild animals, especially non-human primates,
rodents and bats (Wolfe, Dunavan & Diamond, 2007; Jones
et al., 2008; Han et al., 2016), although many of these were
transmitted to humans via intermediate hosts, such as com-
panion, farmed or feral animals (Wolfe et al., 2007). As an
example, there is a broad consensus that human viruses
responsible for HIV-AIDS resulted from multiple cross-
species spillovers of simian immunodeficiency viruses involv-
ing the chimpanzee Pan troglodytes, western gorilla Gorilla gorilla
and sooty mangabey Cercocebus atys. Lentiviruses, such as
HIV, penetrate mucous membranes; therefore contact with
non-human primate body fluids associated with the hunting,
butchering and consumption of animals likely led to spill-
overs. One transmission event, probably occurring between
1910 and 1930, gave rise to the HIV strain behind pandemic
AIDS (Sharp & Hahn, 2011). Ebola has been suggested to
Table 1. Terminology used herein to describe animal
categories
Term Description
Wildlife We use the IUCN terminology to define
wildlife as “living things that are neither
human nor domesticated”, but due to the
nature of our review we focus on both
terrestrial and aquatic animals, especially
mammals and birds, and exclude fish,
plants, fungi and aquatic invertebrates
(e.g. molluscs and crustaceans) due to
lower opportunity for disease
transmission that would result in human–
human infections.
Wild sourced Animals taken from the wild directly for
trade, which may include legal or illegal
trade in live wild animals (e.g. for food or
exotic pets) or their parts and derivatives
(e.g. for food or medicine). This includes
ranched or captive-raised animals, where
eggs or young were taken from the wild




We consider wild animals bred in captivity
as distinct from wild-sourced animals. We
define farmed wild animals as those with a
phenotype not significantly affected by
human selection and raised in controlled
conditions and productive farm systems
(e.g. mink Neovison vison for fur; bears,
primarily Ursus thibetanus, or Tokay geckos
Gekko gekko for traditional medicine; tigers
Panthera tigris in tiger farms; bamboo rats,
often Rhizomys sinensis, raised for food) and
use ‘captive wildlife’ for those in




We consider domesticated species as those
whose phenotype is driven by long-term
human selection. Within this category we
use the terms ‘livestock’ for animals raised
primarily for meat and other animal
products (e.g. pigs, poultry, cattle, sheep,
goats, some camelids such as dromedary
and llamas), ‘pets’ to refer to animals such
as cats and dogs kept as companions or
ornamentally, and ‘feral’ or ‘unmanaged
and free roaming’ as per the OIE–World
Organisation for Animal Health
definition to refer to domestic animals
normally kept as pets or livestock but
which are living without direct human
supervision or control, often in areas
where they are not native (e.g. stray dogs,
cats and goats).
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have been transmitted from bats (Leroy et al., 2005; Saéz
et al., 2015), either directly or via an intermediate host, while
MERS (Middle-East Respiratory Syndrome) most probably
originated in a species of bat, with the dromedary
camel Camelus dromedarius as an intermediate host (Mohd,
Al-Tawfiq & Memish, 2016).
Our knowledge of pathogen prevalence in wildlife popula-
tions is heavily biased by host species, pathogen type and
sample availability, but studies can provide deep insights into
the diversity of potential zoonotic pathogens (e.g. for bat-
borne coronaviruses; Anthony et al., 2017). Species are
defined as being capable of harbouring a particular zoonotic
pathogen following the detection of that pathogen, but only
pathogens that can be reliably detected and identified are
recognised. In the natural host, however, infection loads
may be low and not readily detectable even with modern
molecular methods; testing might also be conducted on sam-
ples that are suboptimal for certain viruses that then could be
missed. Furthermore, most host taxa have not been included
in such studies and remain completely untested. Fewer than
300 viruses from 25 high-risk viral families are known to
infect people, yet it is estimated that there are around 1.7 mil-
lion viruses from these same viral families that have not yet
been discovered in mammals and birds. Of these, some
700000 are considered to have zoonotic potential (Carroll
et al., 2018).
Zoonotic diseases can emerge from a wide variety of wild
species, including marine turtles (Aguirre et al., 2006) and
marine mammals (Waltzek et al., 2012), but the risk appears
variable, with the highest risk taxa being rodents (Han
et al., 2015, 2016), non-human primates (Pedersen
et al., 2005) and bats (Luis et al., 2013). Transmission in this
context can occur through a range of direct and indirect
pathways (e.g. infected faeces, urine, saliva, invertebrate vec-
tors), from interactions with species in natural habitats or
during the supply, transport and use of wildlife or wildlife
products.
Based on the number of different infected host species, as
well as phylogenetic relatedness among hosts, zoonotic path-
ogens can be characterised as specialists (a single wildlife host
species) or generalists (multiple wildlife host species). The lat-
ter often can persist by being maintained in multiple wildlife
species. Understanding pathogen ecology and evolution
offers many advantages in terms of strengthening surveil-
lance programs aimed at preventing or reducing human
exposure and zoonotic infection, as well as informing early
warning systems for outbreak detection.
Many host species characteristics contribute to a height-
ened risk of zoonotic transfer. Several zoonoses of high
impact for humans originated from non-human primates,
probably in part because the phylogenetic barrier to trans-
mission to humans is low (Wolfe et al., 2007). In rodents, res-
ervoir species are associated with a fast-paced life-history
strategy, rapid maturation and high fecundity (Han
et al., 2015); these characteristics mean that some species
carry multiple pathogens, increasing the probability of a
Fig. 1. A conceptual diagram of animal-use supply chains and their interfaces, identifying different intervention points and
intervention options at different stages in the supply chain.
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rodent being infected with a pathogen with zoonotic poten-
tial. The high population size and density of many rodents
is probably also an important factor. It is hypothesised that
pathogen-prone rodent species may have low investment in
immune defences, but ‘outrun’ the risk of a lethal infection
by producing offspring quickly (Han et al., 2015).
The comparatively high zoonotic disease risk from bats
(Luis et al., 2013) has been linked to large colony sizes and
high mobility due to flight, resulting in even larger effective
population sizes and many bat species having the capacity
to host a wide range of pathogens. The highest predictor of
zoonotic viral richness in bats was the distribution overlap
with sympatric species, suggesting that interspecific transmis-
sion probably plays a key role in the pathogen complement
harboured by bats (Luis et al., 2013). Evolved physiological
adaptations to flight might also have enabled bats to harbour
a larger range of pathogens in the absence of disease (O’Shea
et al., 2014), as their immune systems seem to have been mod-
ified to enable protective cellular mechanisms, a dampened
interferon response, and a key innate defence pathway that
is functionally different from non-bat mammals, implying
that bats may be more effective at co-existing with a large
number of viruses (Xie et al., 2018). The rigours of flight
mean that bat metabolisms can increase by up to 16 times
the basal rate, producing sufficient heat to kill most mammals
(Speakman & Thomas, 2003; O’Shea et al., 2014). As a con-
sequence of these costs, bats have adapted mechanisms to
prevent degradation of cellular mechanisms by heat or oxy-
gen radicals, affecting their ability to withstand infections
(Healy et al., 2014; Huang et al., 2019). Together, these prop-
erties allow them to be asymptomatic reservoirs of multiple
viruses, thus enabling these viruses to persist within bat popu-
lations. Stress responses in most mammals are shown to
increase the probability of spillover (Hara et al., 2011), yet
such studies in bats are only now being conducted
(Subudhi, Rapin & Misra, 2019). Understanding how the
role of habitat loss and degradation combines with natural
stressors (e.g. reproduction and migration) is urgently
needed. However, studies show that at least some mecha-
nisms of physical stress in bats do increase viral shedding;
for example, bats infected with the fungal pathogen Pseudo-
gymnoascus destructans can have a viral load that is increased
by up to 60 times that of bats without this fungal infection
(Davy et al., 2018).
In addition to these hypotheses, a simpler explanation is
that both rodents and bats are also highly diverse vertebrate
orders (2361 rodent species and 1420 bat species) and more
species-rich reservoir groups host more virus species and
therefore a larger number of zoonotic pathogens (Letko
et al., 2020; Mollentze & Streicker, 2020).
Other, non-taxon-specific characteristics also contribute
to zoonotic pathogen risk. For example, migratory species
can have a profound effect on pathogen dispersal, but these
effects are complex and context dependent (Altizer, Bartel &
Han, 2011; Poulin & de Angeli Dutra, 2021). Migration can
play a key role in introducing disease to populations naïve
to the pathogen, and the heavy toll of migration can
reduce immune function, so increasing infection burden.
Conversely, migration can allow individuals to escape
infected areas and, hence, reduce host population pathogen
levels. The unsuccessful migration of infected individuals
might also lead to overall reductions in pathogen prevalence
(Huber et al., 2020).
Where pathogens are thought to be of wildlife origin, their
emergence is often associated with a high diversity of patho-
gens in a wide range of host species (Jones et al., 2008; Allen
et al., 2017; Anthony et al., 2017), and many emerge in biodi-
verse tropical regions. However, the role of biodiversity in
zoonotic disease emergence is complex. Studies have identi-
fied a general trend, known as the ‘dilution effect’, where
increasing host diversity can reduce a given parasite abun-
dance in both wild animals and humans (Civitello
et al., 2015; Huang et al., 2017), although this effect depends
on specific conditions, context and on the metrics used
(Salkeld, Padgett & Jones, 2013; Roberts &
Heesterbeek, 2018). While empirical evidence exists for the
dilution effect in several multi-host pathogen systems,
the mechanism is often unclear, for example whether it is
due to actual dilution or to reduced host density
(Begon, 2008).
Pathogen transmission from wildlife to humans is influ-
enced by extrinsic factors, such as land-use change (Allen
et al., 2017) and agricultural intensification (Jones
et al., 2013). Such factors play a particularly important role
in driving the emergence of zoonotic diseases in biodiverse
tropical forest regions (Keesing et al., 2010), where expanding
human populations (and associated agriculture or other
activities) into natural habitats leads to increased opportuni-
ties for human-to-wildlife contact (Han et al., 2016; Bloom-
field, McIntosh & Lambin, 2020) and increased pathogen
transmission at human–livestock–wildlife interfaces
(Gebreyes et al., 2014). Multi-host pathogen models indicate
that pathogen transmission between species inhabiting intact
and converted habitat is highest when rates of habitat con-
version are intermediate (Johnson et al., 2020). However,
the potential severity of epidemics increases at higher rates
of habitat conversion (Faust et al., 2018). Land-use change
that reduces local biodiversity may increase spillover risk
(Civitello et al., 2015), as exemplified by Lyme disease in
North America (Ostfeld & Keesing, 2000, 2012). While the
diversity of wildlife species declines with habitat degradation,
it has been shown that those species more able to live in
human-modified habitat tend to have a higher rate of car-
riage of zoonotic pathogens than those that decline or disap-
pear (Gibb et al., 2020).
Hunting, whether commercially or for subsistence, and
the transport, sale, preparation and use of wild animals
and wild animal products are also important points of
human–wildlife contact. Direct wildlife use, especially for
human consumption, is most commonly an issue for zoo-
notic emergence in the ‘paleotropics’, where high species
diversity of high-risk taxa (e.g. of bats and primates) is
combined with subsistence hunting and use (Han
et al., 2016). Harvesting rates of wild meat in tropical areas
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are currently primarily driven by an increase in demand in
fast-growing urban centres (Coad et al., 2019). Interactions
between wildlife and humans can have complex and hard-
to-predict effects, by increasing both stress and movement
of species and therefore increased spread of disease and
spillover risk. For example, the culling of badgers Meles
meles is known to increase the movement of surviving ani-
mals and, hence, the spread of bovine tuberculosis
(Woodroffe et al., 2006).
It seems likely that it is human interactions with, and
destruction of, biodiversity that leads to increased likeli-
hood of zoonotic disease emergence. However, the path-
ways to overcome this are likely to be complex. It has
been suggested that protecting ecosystems not currently
posing a major threat of disease to humans or wildlife
might prevent increases in disease emergence, yet when
managing a specific disease for which the ecology is rea-
sonably well understood, it might be more effective to
manage the particular species (vectors or amplifying or
diluting hosts) or habitats that are known to decrease or
increase the likelihood of pathogen spillover, for example,
through vaccination, culling, predator supplementation or
habitat manipulation (Rohr et al., 2019).
(4) Disease transfer involving domestic animals
Many zoonotic outbreaks result from pathogen transmis-
sion from domestic animals. Human pathogens considered
to originate from the domestication process of animals
include diphtheria, influenza A, measles, mumps, pertus-
sis, rotavirus, and smallpox (Wolfe et al., 2007) and con-
tacts between humans and domestic animals have led to
recent zoonotic emergence events, such as the H1N1
(Swine Flu) pandemic in 2009 and MERS in 2012. The
emergence of many of these diseases has been facilitated
by the increased human population size and the develop-
ment of commercial agriculture and livestock domestica-
tion (Wolfe et al., 2007; Jones et al., 2013), as well as
agricultural encroachment leading to increased
livestock–wildlife interactions and more opportunities for
livestock acting as bridging species for novel zoonotic
pathogens such as Nipah (Pulliam et al., 2011). Due to
thousands of years of domestication, high contact rates
and significant amounts of study, ungulates are the mam-
malian group with which humans are known to share the
most pathogens (Cleaveland, Laurenson & Taylor, 2001).
In temperate regions, the majority of the heaviest-burden
zoonotic diseases impact humans through domestic live-
stock. Transmission routes of pathogens from livestock
are facilitated by poor hygiene and biosecurity measures,
such as lack of protective equipment for farm workers
(Ramirez et al., 2006), and can occur through a variety of
direct and indirect interactions during the rearing of live-
stock. Numerous other zoonotic diseases involve a vector
stage, such as Rift Valley fever or Crimean-Congo hae-
morrhagic fever (CCHF), where the host is a tick and the
vector is a mammal (Wilson et al., 1991).
(5) Disease transfer involving wild or exotic pets
Although information is comparatively scarce, wild or exotic
pets (i.e. not domesticated animal pets) are another possible
source of novel zoonoses with epidemic potential. For exam-
ple, in 2003 six states in the USA experienced an outbreak of
monkeypox, the first cases of human monkeypox reported
outside the African continent. This outbreak resulted from
prairie dogs Cynomys sp. sold as pets after being housed in
close proximity to infected rodents recently imported from
Ghana (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2003).
In 1999, an Egyptian rousette bat Rousettus aegyptiacus sold in
a pet shop in France was diagnosed with Lagos bat lyssavirus
encephalitis, resulting in the treatment of 120 exposed per-
sons (Chomel, Belotto & Meslin, 2007). Variegated squirrels
Sciurus variegatoides imported from Latin America as exotic
pets were the identified host of a novel zoonotic Bornavirus
(VSBV-1) that infected, and led to fatal progressive encepha-
litis or meningoencephalitis, in three squirrel breeders in
Germany in 2011–2013 (Hoffmann et al., 2015).
Some actions to combat zoonotic disease depend on an
understanding of links between animal welfare and pathogen
transmission, including the immune response, which is
directly influenced by welfare (Broom & Fraser, 2015). For
example, poor welfare during the transport of cattle or sheep
can result in the opportunistically pathogenic bacterium
Mannheimia (Pasteurella) haemolytica causing disease (Broom &
Kirkden, 2004). Disease and mortality rates are higher in
farm animals that have poor levels of welfare, and in wild ani-
mals if stressed when brought into captivity (EFSA, 2006;
Leday et al., 2018). If wild animals are captured and kept,
capture stress as well as transport stress and other stressors
(e.g. being caged with or next to conspecifics or other species;
close proximity to people; rough handling; inadequate food
or water; exposure to the elements; poor hygiene, etc.)
increases their susceptibility to infection with pathogens and
the likelihood that they will shed pathogens with or without
the development of clinical disease, perhaps thereby infecting
humans or other animals (Broom&Kirkden, 2004; Broom&
Johnson, 2019).
(6) State of knowledge on coronaviruses – origins
and transfer
Seven coronaviruses (CoVs) are currently known to infect
humans (Andersen et al., 2020), four of which are regularly
found in human populations in which they cause only mild
symptoms (Corman et al., 2018). However, the betacorona-
viruses, SARS-CoV-1, MERS and SARS-CoV-2, have been
associated with fatalities and, in the case of MERS, with high
fatality rates (Zhou et al., 2020b). There is evidence that CoVs
that infect humans have their origins in either bat or rodent
species (Salata et al., 2019). Intermediate species have
included both domestic and captive wild animals (including
cattle and swine), masked palm civets Paguma larvata and
dromedaries (Drexler, Corman & Drosten, 2014; Corman
et al., 2018). Diverse CoVs have been found in bats in
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China, with 6.5% of all bats in one study testing positive for
at least one coronavirus (Tang et al., 2006), and with SARs-
like viruses confirmed in horseshoe bats Rhinolophus spp. in
2005 (Li et al., 2005). Since then, further betacoronaviruses
have been detected in wild-caught rhinolophid bats across
the Old World (Gouilh et al., 2011). Over 200 novel corona-
viruses have been identified in bats and approximately 35%
of the sequenced bat virome is composed of coronaviruses
(Banerjee et al., 2019).
Although many CoVs are limited to bats, some are found
in a more diverse selection of mammals. Coronavirus studies
have predominantly focused on non-bat hosts, which include
both mammals (alpha and betacoronavirus) and birds
(gamma and deltacoronavirus), yet few betacoronaviruses
have been detected outside bats in the wild. In bats, CoVs
have been found in bat families across the globe (Drexler
et al., 2014), with groups such as Hipposideridae known to
host these viruses asymptomatically for extended periods.
Typically, CoVs have a highly restricted host range: even
bats within the same cave often show different viruses in dif-
ferent species, with only those detected in Miniopterus spp.
known to be capable of jumping between hosts (Gouilh
et al., 2011), normally as a consequence of roosting in direct
physical contact with other bat species. The destruction or
disturbance of caves by people can lead to different species
and taxa being forced to share caves and, given their different
abilities to host or pass on betacoronaviruses, this increases
the risk of virus spread across species. Furthermore, as rhino-
lophid bats (in which SARS-like viruses have been detected)
can develop clinical coronaviral disease, spillover risk may
be higher from this group (Wong et al., 2019). The shared
use of bat caves by non-bat hosts, such as Viverridae (civets
and genets), increases the risk of spillover into new host spe-
cies (Song et al., 2005), especially as betacoronaviruses are
most commonly detected in faeces (Wong et al., 2019). Rapid
adaptation of SARS-CoVs has been observed to occur
between hosts (such as masked palm civets and humans)
and host shifts have also been observed to occur amongst
bat species in wild populations (Cui et al., 2007; Latinne
et al., 2020; Zhou et al., 2020a).
The wildlife trade, both legal and illegal, has received
enormous global media attention for its potential role in the
emergence of novel zoonoses like SARS and COVID-19.
Illegal wildlife trade alone is estimated to be a multibillion-
dollar industry, comparable to the international trades in
narcotics and weapons, and which raises significant human
and animal health concerns, especially given its volume, the
complete lack of regulation and the fact that the origins of
wildlife sometimes match recognised emerging infectious dis-
ease hotspots (Smith et al., 2017). However, there remains
considerable uncertainty around which species have been
involved in the transfer of the causative coronaviruses to
humans, as well as exactly when such transfers occurred
(Corman et al., 2018; Salata et al., 2019). The virus with the
closest match to SARS-CoV-2 has been found in several spe-
cies of horseshoe bat Rhinolophus spp., which likely represent
the ancestral or evolutionary (natural) host of the virus
(Zhou et al., 2020a), although the ability of this closest known
relative of SARS-CoV-2 to infect humans is poor (Wan
et al., 2020). A related virus has been detected in Malayan
pangolin Manis javanica (Zhang, Wu & Zhang, 2020). While
different overall from any known bat CoV, the pangolin
CoV receptor binding domain part of the spike protein
(which allows the virus to infect a new host) is almost identical
to that found in the human virus (Zhou et al., 2020a), but a
polybasic cleavage site in SARS-CoV-2 is absent from both
known pangolin and bat CoVs, so the origin and route to
human infection of SARS-CoV-2 remains unknown
(Andersen et al., 2020). The potential for the transmission of
zoonotic CoVs through wildlife markets and farm systems,
however, has been clearly noted for SARS-CoV (Wong
et al., 2019) and actions to prevent such zoonotic spillover risk
in future have been widely discussed (e.g. Kelly et al., 2020;
Nabi et al., 2020; Ribeiro et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2020).
III. SOLUTION SCANNING: IDENTIFYING
OPTIONS FORMINIMISING ZOONOTICDISEASE
TRANSFER
(1) The need for solution scanning
Creating a future in which society is more resilient to zoo-
notic diseases will require coordination and planning among
different professionals, considering a broad range of preven-
tion options related to wild, feral and domestic animals, all of
which have potential to be the source of future epidemics in
humans. These will range frommedical and veterinary inter-
ventions to simple behavioural and societal interventions that
could greatly reduce the risk of pathogen transfer (Morse
et al., 2012). Solution scanning uses published research and
guidance, the experience of experts and practitioners,
and brainstorming to identify a range of potential solutions
to a specific problem (Sutherland et al., 2014). This includes
solutions that have not been reviewed, might not have evi-
dence of effectiveness or may indeed be ineffective, inconve-
nient, controversial or have negative side effects. It is
therefore important that practitioners and policy makers
identify possible interventions as a starting point in
decision-making before evidence synthesis and consideration
of each option’s advantages and disadvantages are con-
ducted. The need for this is illustrated by previous research
that showed that 92 conservation practitioners responsible
for addressing a problem were only aware of 57% of the pos-
sible actions (Walsh, Dicks & Sutherland, 2015).
We conducted a solution scan to identify options for
reducing the animal–human transfer of zoonotic pathogens
with high potential for human-to-human transmission, such
as COVID-19. The solution scan was compiled by docu-
menting our own experience of actions, consulting guidance
and scientific literature, and contacting a number of experts
and practitioners working in different countries, contexts
and institutions in order to explore the range of options avail-
able. The approach is based on methods developed as part of
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subject-wide evidence synthesis (Sutherland et al., 2020). This
solutions scan was initiated as a collaboration between
BioRISC (the Biosecurity Research Initiative at St Cathar-
ine’s College, Cambridge), Conservation Evidence based in
the Department of Zoology, University of Cambridge, and
numerous other researchers worldwide. The options consid-
ered here are diverse, reflecting the variety of possible trans-
mission pathways at the wildlife–livestock–human interface
that are discussed in Section II from wildlife, domesticated
and captive animals (Table 1). Our review excludes other
sources of potential zoonotic disease emergence which could
be responsible for future pandemics including (i) the evolu-
tion of antimicrobial resistance (AMR), (ii) pathogen release
from laboratories, or (iii) the intentional creation of life. It is
important to note that AMR is a topic of enormous impor-
tance: AMR could be responsible for 10 million deaths per
year by 2050 if left unchecked (O’Neill, 2014). However,
we exclude AMR from this study due to differences in the
type of pathways of disease emergence, including pathogen
selection in effluent pollution and the overuse and misuse of
antibiotics in farming and medical settings. Nevertheless,
many of the animal husbandry options considered herein,
in particular those related to improvements in hygiene and
health standards, are directly relevant to enabling reduced
use of antimicrobials on farms and thus avoiding the selection
of resistant strains.
(2) Interpreting the list of options
We stress that the list provided below is a list of options for
consideration and testing, not a list of recommendations or
prescriptions. Many options listed may not be feasible, prac-
tical or affordable in some situations. For example, the
options available to small-scale subsistence farmers will differ
from those available to large-scale commercial farms. Simi-
larly, options available in countries with poor animal health
and hygiene infrastructure, weak governance and low capac-
ity to regulate or control the local wild meat trade, interna-
tional wildlife trade, and few available medical testing
facilities, will differ from those available to countries with
state-of-the-art facilities, diagnostic equipment or strict law
enforcement.
It should be recognised that solution scanning is a
dynamic process which means that the current list should
not be viewed as exhaustive. While effort has been made
to compile as complete a list as possible using expert opin-
ion and international collaboration, the vast literature
available on specific livestock groups has not been system-
atically searched, and there may be further options avail-
able. This is also true for the wildlife trade literature
given the diversity of ways in which animals are used
across the globe (e.g. wild meat, exotic pets, medicines,
curios, medical research, etc.). Additions to the list are
welcome and can be sent to biorisc@caths.cam.ac.uk,
and will be added to an updated list of options available
at https://covid-19.biorisc.com.
IV. THE LIST OF OPTIONS
The options outlined below are split into four main sections,
(1) supply-side measures, (2) transport and sale, (3) measures
to tackle consumption, and (4) measures to create appropri-
ate enabling environments (Fig. 1). Measures are focussed
on the diverse categories of animals defined in Table 1.
The options listed here need to be assessed for the local con-
text of implementation (e.g. likely effectiveness, costs, feasibil-
ity, acceptability), including for their broader implications for
the local human communities potentially affected.
(1) Supply side
Supply-side measures are any that are applied to the produc-
tion or sourcing of animals (i.e. rearing of farmed wildlife or
livestock or hunting – endeavouring to kill or capture wild
animals). They focus on preventing or reducing production,
or altering the production process to reduce risk (’tSas-Rolfes
et al., 2019).
Supply-side interventions to prevent zoonotic emer-
gence from wildlife may focus on: (i) entirely preventing
hunting and collection of high-risk species (area-based or
species-based restrictions); (ii) controlling the rate of hunt-
ing and collection through limits to numbers or specific
characteristics of the animals taken; or (iii) regulating
hunting, consolidation and trade through enforced stan-
dards. Preventing or reducing hunting, collecting and dis-
turbance of wild species, especially of high-risk species,
should decrease the transmission of zoonotic diseases to
livestock and people (Johnson et al., 2020). For example,
it can reduce the rate of contact between hunters and ani-
mals in the wild, and therefore reduce direct animal-to-
human transmission. It can also reduce the movement of
wild animals out of natural habitats, to places where they
have more contact with people and other animals
(e.g. markets and other vendors) (Swift et al., 2007). For
species that are lower risk for direct transmission, regu-
lated harvesting, with licensing, standards and health or
hygiene checks at critical control points, could reduce
high-risk practices that cause transmission
(e.g. unhygienic slaughter, interaction of domestic and
non-domestic animals), and in some cases may be more
effective than complete bans (e.g. Fournié et al., 2013).
For livestock, supply-side interventions to prevent zoonotic
emergence may focus on: (i) improving animal welfare,
health and immune function in farms by limiting density,
ensuring veterinary care and reducing long-distance trans-
port or practices that involve large-scale and long-distance
live animal movements (e.g. by promoting ranching instead
of nomadism); (ii) preventing the mixing of domesticated
and wild-sourced or farmed wildlife animals in farms; or
(iii) improving the biosecurity of farming practices (e.g. via
the use of disposable protective clothing and introduction
of health surveillance for farm workers as well as controlled
slaughter and hygiene conditions).
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(a) Area-based management (e.g. protected areas)
The emergence of infectious diseases is elevated in high-
biodiversity areas experiencing land-use changes (Allen
et al., 2017) as well as in landscapes that have been degraded
(Bloomfield et al., 2020; Gibb et al., 2020). Well-enforced
area-based management can reduce land-use change
(Bruner et al., 2001) but further measures may be needed to
directly address illegal hunting (Geldman et al., 2019; see
Section IV.1b).
• Identify and protect unprotected areas with high biodiver-
sity or important habitat features that are at risk from land-
use change, particularly those with high-risk species
(e.g. bat roosts).
• Strengthen the boundaries of existing protected areas
(PAs) using clear demarcation to reduce illegal hunting.
• Establish and reinforce regulation for buffer zones around
PAs to reduce human–wildlife–livestock interfaces at the
boundaries.
• Increase efficiency of patrols to detect and prevent hunting,
collection or disturbance of high-risk wildlife species through
increasing patrol effort, targeting key times (e.g. breeding sea-
son when potential stress is highest), places (e.g. boundaries
and high-risk areas), and offenders (e.g. using acoustic moni-
toring, drones and surveillance aircraft, thermal cameras,
human detection software, satellite data).
• Build capacity for wildlife stewardship amongst hunter/
collector communities, or communities living with wildlife
(e.g. local community ranger groups), especially for high-
risk wildlife species.
• Integrate indigenous peoples and local hunter/collector
communities into early warning systems of disease emer-
gence that link to national and international public health
reporting systems.
• Establish a strong monitoring system on buying, selling,
storage and disposal of hunting equipment (e.g. guns, traps
and nets) and/or chemicals/poisons in the vicinity of the
PA to reduce illegal hunting, especially of high-risk species
(e.g. bats, rodents and non-human primates plus any addi-
tionally identified species).
(b) Hunter/collector behaviour change, for wild-sourced
species
Interventions to change hunter behaviour can target intrinsic
motivations (e.g. social norms) or extrinsic motivations
(e.g. incentives/disincentives). Most effective examples of
interventions to change hunter/harvester behaviour typically
combine several intrinsic and extrinsic approaches, and are
based on a sound understanding of local context and culture
(Travers et al., 2011; DeWan et al., 2013; Wright et al., 2016;
Salazar, Mills & Verissimo, 2019; McDonald et al., 2020).
• Conduct community engagement activities and co-design
of interventions to strengthen perceived fairness and legit-
imacy of new laws or standards.
• Identify high-risk species for zoonotic emergence and dis-
incentivise their hunting/collecting and possession, either
alive or as body parts and products.
• Introduce licenses and training in risk reduction and
hygiene for licensed hunters/suppliers to regulate harvest-
ing and possession of high-risk species and their body parts.
• Introduce bans for sales and possession of certain equip-
ment (e.g. nets or snares), or license their use and sale to
prevent hunting or collection of high-risk species.
• Strengthen disincentives for hunter/collector non-
compliance with existing wildlife protection and licensing
laws for high-risk taxa or products (e.g. larger fines and
prison sentences, or enhanced capacity within judicial sys-
tems to increase prosecution rates of collectors/hunters of
high-risk species, whilst ensuring people dependent upon
wild-meat for subsistence can still access resources at min-
imal risk).
• Incentivise switching to lower-risk hunting/harvesting,
either by promoting lower-risk species alternatives
(e.g. by improving access) and/or an alternative hunting/
collecting method that is less damaging or lower risk.
• Incentivise alternative occupations to subsistence hunting
to reduce the need to harvest high-risk species
(e.g. community ranger).
• Build awareness regarding laws, penalties and risk of get-
ting caught, and risks of disease transmission associated
with specific wildlife hunting/collecting (e.g. via signage
around PAs, events, media attention on disease risks,
highly publicised prosecutions).
• Highlight beneficial ecosystem services provided by spe-
cific targeted taxa (e.g. role of bats in pest control in farm-
land, or in seed dispersal in forests), through informational
interventions.
• Provide benefits/decrease costs of living with wildlife
(e.g. performance-based monetary incentives for
wildlife stewardship, compensation for damage caused by
wildlife, or general financial benefits for people living in
proximity to wildlife, such as a conservation-based
income).
• Work with local communities and leaders to reinforce cul-
tural taboos around hunting of high-risk species or the cre-
ation of new negative norms around the harvesting of
high-risk species.
• Develop hygienic animal-handling guidelines for licensed
hunters/suppliers, and modes to enforce them or, where
guidelines already exist, provide training and incentives
for implementation.
(c) Ensure wildlife farming is safe and legal
• Develop procedures and certification standards for low-
risk non-domesticated animals that can be kept and har-
vested sustainably and legally (i.e. with high confidence of
traceability) in captivity for consumption or other uses.
• Develop laws preventing the farming of new wildlife spe-
cies except where the practice is demonstrably low risk
and its products are traceable.
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• Develop centrally administered or licensed tracing systems
for farmed wild species to ensure illegally sourced speci-
mens are not added from the wild.
• Develop certification for registered farms that demonstrate
enforcement of guidelines on safe production standards.
• Develop and enforce minimum welfare and sanitary stan-
dards for animal rearing, which minimise stress-induced
immunosuppression and reduce infection and spread of
disease among captive individuals (e.g. maximum stocking
limits and density of wildlife farming).
(d) Reduce wildlife–livestock–human interfaces in and
around farms and wild places
There are many mechanisms by which pathogens can trans-
mit from wildlife to humans; thus there are multiple means of
reducing contact between wildlife, livestock and humans.
Transmission routes may rely upon direct contact between
wild animals and domestic herds or flocks, for example in
periodic avian influenza outbreaks (FAO, 2007). Thus,
designing suitable enclosures for domestic animals that pre-
clude the entry of wild animals, as well as preventing domes-
tic animals from accessing wildlife habitat, can reduce the risk
of such events. This is particularly relevant for intensive live-
stock production in biodiverse areas, where biosecurity stan-
dards are sometimes not as strict as elsewhere. Examples
include Nipah emergence in Malaysia in 1999 (Pulliam
et al., 2011), swine and avian flu epidemics (Koopmans
et al., 2004) and swine acute diarrhoea syndrome coronavirus
(SADS-CoV) emergence in China in 2016 due to a coronavi-
rus spilling over from bats into an intensive pig farm, then
spreading amongst farms (Zhou et al., 2018).
Wildlife–livestock interfaces are also relevant for backyard
farming practices, with highly variable biosecurity imple-
mentations; contact rates between pigs and wild boar was
demonstrated in the recent African Swine Fever epidemic
(Chenais et al., 2019) but is also a factor in the complex
Influenza A virus transmission pathways (Artois et al., 2009;
Osbjer et al., 2017).
Indirect transmission pathways, such as contamination of
domestic animal feed or bedding by wild animal urine, faeces
or corpses (Crump, Griffin & Angulo, 2002; Daniels, Hutch-
ings & Greig, 2003) can be reduced by excluding entry of
wild animals into feedstores. Contamination of human water
sources and food pre- or during harvesting also presents a
risk, particularly for fresh and raw produce that undergoes
little processing (Jay-Russell, 2013), with examples including
emerging infectious disease epidemics such as the Nipah
virus outbreaks linked to bats contaminating date palm-sap
collection vessels (Islam et al., 2016). Once again, preventing
access of wild animals to fields with livestock, and
preventing access to vessels such as sap collection containers
can reduce risks. A reciprocal approach would prevent live-
stock and poultry from encroaching on wildlife habitat.
Nipah virus also directly infected pigs in open facilities,
which subsequently served as intermediary hosts and infected
humans (Yob et al., 2001). Other outbreaks have unknown
bat-to-human transmission pathways (Luby et al., 2009).
For insect-vector-borne pathogens the interactions may be
more complex, requiring the presence of wild animals and
humans/livestock within a vector range, but also influenced
by factors altering vector populations. For example, defores-
tation can lead to increased standing water and reduced
shade, increasing the reproductive success of some mosquito
species. By contrast, urbanisation can remove anopheline
mosquito habitat, thus reducing vector populations
(Kilpatrick & Randolph, 2012). For many such known risks,
various prevention methods may have been tried (Nahar
et al., 2010; Clausen et al., 2012), but the costs of such
measures may be restrictive, and their effectiveness limited
by climate change-related events such as droughts or floods,
which can be hard to anticipate.
• Increase understanding of pathogen hosts and potential
transmission mechanisms among wildlife and livestock,
captive-bred animals and humans.
• Reduce contact and possible pathogen transmission
among wildlife, humans and livestock (e.g. by improving
crop protection using fencing).
• Introduce legislation to reduce and control the spread of
animal agriculture and overlap/proximity to tropical for-
est/‘undisturbed ecosystems’, e.g. via legally required
buffer zones.
• Limit the spread of urbanisation into natural areas with
high potential for disease transmission (e.g. by protecting
and patrolling forest edges near towns and villages in trop-
ical areas).
• Protect, fence-off and signpost areas used by target wildlife
species (e.g. important roosting trees, caves) near and
inside farmland or urban areas.
• Create and enforce protocols for maintaining biosafety
during caving, such as the use of waterproof coveralls
and masks, in caves or other areas with high bat density.
• Reduce contact between wild and farmed or domestic ani-
mals (e.g. by separating grazing or watering areas using
fencing to increase biosecurity of farmed animals).
• Provide alternative areas for target wildlife species, away
from human settlements or farms (e.g. alternative roosting
areas for bats or birds).
• Develop mechanisms to reduce the interaction of wild
birds with domestic birds and humans (e.g. prevent
object and food contamination with faeces from wild
birds).
• Develop guidelines for mining, logging and other activities
likely to disturb important wildlife habitats to reduce risks
and disturbance to wildlife species with high disease trans-
mission risk, especially at particular times of year
(e.g. breeding, tree fruiting season, etc.).
• Influence social norms of local communities and visitors
around behaviours leading to close contact with high-risk
species and specific activities (e.g. keeping primates as pets;
disturbance or destruction of bat roosting areas) leading to
contact with people or livestock.
Biological Reviews (2021) 000–000 © 2021 The Authors. Biological Reviews published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Cambridge Philosophical Society.
Options for preventing future zoonotic epidemics 11
• Ensure good hygiene when visiting places with high wild
animal densities, in particular for high-risk species
(i.e. disinfect footwear after visiting caves, wear protective
equipment in caves, etc.).
• Store and protect human and animal feed in areas where
they cannot be accessed and potentially contaminated by
wildlife (e.g. by bat or rodent faeces or urine).
• Protect food collection/harvesting processes such as sap
tapping (e.g. date palm sap) from contamination from
wildlife.
(e) Increase animal hygiene and health standards for
livestock and farmed wild animal production
Interactions between livestock (all farmed animals), humans
and wildlife risks pathogen spillover. Livestock can become
hosts (intermediate or amplifier) allowing pathogen evolution
before spillover into humans. Expanding and intensifying
livestock production is creating more intensive interactions
among livestock, people and wildlife, contributing to emerg-
ing disease events (Jones et al., 2013). Proposed solutions
involve improved farm hygiene and livestock health stan-
dards, including separation of species and age groups in
farms (Henning et al., 2009) and should be complemented
by demand-side measures (like reduced livestock production,
especially in areas encroaching on wild habitats). For many
intensive farming systems there are detailed and comprehen-
sive biosecurity guidelines and insurance schemes (Hovi,
Mcleod & Gunn, 2005). However, these are often only feasi-
ble in countries with sufficient infrastructure and trained per-
sonnel. Increasing global standards of production systems for
animals should be amajor concern for preventing future zoo-
notic pandemics, especially in low- and middle-income coun-
tries (LMICs) that are often at the highest risk of zoonotic
epidemics. Many options listed here require veterinary infra-
structure for health, hygiene and surveillance efforts and this
must be a target of development programmes.
Intensive livestock systems generally have fewer direct
farm workers, which reduces the number of people in contact
with livestock but also contain high-density populations of
low genetic diversity, which may favour increased transmis-
sion and likelihood of adaptations if pathogens are intro-
duced (Jones et al., 2013). High animal density can increase
the frequency of outbreaks; for example, a higher density of
pig farms and higher numbers of trucks entering the farms
was associated with an increased frequency of pig respiratory
disease outbreaks (Rose & Madec, 2002)
• Develop and enforce minimum health, welfare and
sanitary standards for animal rearing that minimise
stress-induced immunosuppression and reduce the spread
of disease into and among captive individuals.
• Develop a veterinary health plan.
• Ensure regular veterinary visits and preventative care.
• Seek veterinary care at the first sign of illness in an animal.
• Develop standards for limiting animal population densities
where biosecurity cannot be ensured.
• House sick animals in isolated areas.
• Enforce animal health monitoring, especially for notifiable
and emerging diseases and implement regular animal
health surveillance programs and early warning systems
to detect zoonotic pathogens promptly.
• Conduct risk assessment at the wildlife–livestock–human
interfaces to inform the type of emergency response or lon-
ger term planning for prevention and control of zoonotic
pathogens.
• Provide clean, fresh drinking water for animals.
• Ensure that water sources are not contaminated by
manure or slurry (stored and freshly spread).
• Dispose of farm waste products (bedding, slurry) away
from livestock, humans and watercourses.
• Spread slurry on arable land rather than land for grass/
silage for grazing animals or let slurry rest for several
months before spreading on pasture.
• Dispose of fallen stock quickly and in approved, bio-
safe ways.
• Educate and train workers to identify early signs of diseases
and have action protocols when symptoms are detected.
• Engage in industry-wide assurance schemes, so health
plans are generic rather than farm specific.
• Reduce animal density both within and among farms.
• Take measures to reduce stress in farmed animals includ-
ing maximum permissible stocking densities and other
basic welfare standards.
• Separate poultry and pigs by age and species.
• Use all-in, all-out, single-species management strategies
for growing or ‘fattening’ meat animals of all species.
(f ) Farm biosecurity
The FAO defines biosecurity as the implementation of mea-
sures to reduce the risk of the introduction and spread of dis-
ease agents (FAO, 2007). There is no standardised way of
classifying biosecurity measures but measures can be
grouped into bioexclusion (preventing diseases from entering
the farm) and biocontainment (preventing diseases from leav-
ing the farm). Key notions of farm biosecurity are: (i) isola-
tion, to ensure no contamination through housing or
personal protective equipment; (ii) traffic control, to restrict
movement of products, stocks and people; (iii) sanitation, to
maintain cleanliness (Conan et al., 2012). Resources some-
times limit the ability to apply biosecure measures, but where
possible good practice includes:
• Introduce licensing and monitoring of sanitary practices,
especially where high-risk species are involved.
• Clean and disinfect clothing, equipment and vehicles
before and after contact with animals.
• Use disposable protective clothing, and shower in and out
of farms.
• Provide clean protective clothing and footwear for visitors.
• Keep external vehicles outside the perimeter of the farm,
and configure farms so vehicles can carry out their tasks
(e.g. transport loading) as far from the farm as possible. If
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not possible, use an antiseptic vehicle shower at the
entrance of all domestic farms.
• Use personal protective equipment and strict sanitary
measures wherever possible for all farm workers and in
particular for personnel in direct contact with livestock.
• Introduce and enforce health surveillance protocols for
farm workers and promote good hygiene such as regularly
brushing and disinfecting footwear.
• Use adequate ventilation, waste disposal and compart-
ments inside farm systems to minimise disease
transmission.
• Choose farm facilities (flooring, gates, walls) that can be
disinfected easily.
• Limit and control farm visitors, including provision of
clear guidance at all access points, and a bell/horn for vis-
itors to attract attention without having to enter the farm.
• Introduce and enforce nominal registers for any farm visi-
tors to allow traceability.
• Enforce a minimum period visitors must have not had con-
tact with relevant livestock species.
• Introduce footbaths/mats with disinfectant at every farm
entrance and exit.
• Prevent symptomatic people from entering farms (e.g peo-
ple with flu-like symptoms on pig farms) and enforce a
minimum symptom-free period before entering.
• Introduce a minimum period between visits to high-stock-
ing-density livestock units that house similar species or spe-
cies with high disease transmission risks.
• Provide sheltered (i.e. protected access or, if possible,
indoors) drinking water and food to avoid contamination
by wild animals, especially for poultry.
• Provide feed for animals in free-ranging systems to mini-
mise the risk of foraging behaviours leading to introduc-
tion of a pathogen.
• Minimise new animal introductions (both number of
sources and individuals), check their health status, isolate
them (by keeping them at least 3 m away) and use separate
equipment for these animals before introducing them to
others on the farm.
• Minimise the animal’s exposure to people, animals and
wildlife by purchasing directly rather than through
markets.
• Use the same isolation and health-checking procedure for
animals returning from contact with others (such as shows,
markets etc.).
• Prevent mixing of domesticated and wild-sourced or
farmed wildlife animals in farms.
• Discourage or make more secure the backyard farming
system of semi-wild animals (e.g. use fencing to avoid reg-
ular contact with humans).
• Enforce laws to ensure mandatory quarantine for exported
and imported domestic and wild animals.
• Disinfect farm areas between production batches, and if
possible employ an all-in, all-out system.
• Configure farms to minimise livestock exposure to
humans, agricultural pests (e.g. rodents, crows, etc.),
neighbouring livestock and wildlife.
• Control the presence of birds in domestic animal farms, for
example by reducing visits of wild birds (crows, seagulls,
pigeons) and rodents (rat, mice etc.).
• Create means to bring outdoor animals indoors if neces-
sary in periods of high risk of disease transfer (especially
poultry).
• Use fenced or indoors-only farming systems (in particular
where there are risks of interaction with wildlife species)
or have double fencing to provide a buffer between wildlife
and livestock.
• Keep bedding stores covered and shut to prevent access by
cats, dogs, agricultural pests and wildlife.
• Establish clear land zoning for human settlements and the
farming of domestic animals to avoid unexpected overlap
between settlements and farmland that could create
human–animal interfaces.
• Promptly wash and disinfect any bites and scratches
inflicted by animals.
• Avoid contact with sick animals (e.g. with diarrhoea).
(2) Transport and sale
Transactional interventions focus on any points in the supply
chain between source and consumer, for the transport or sale
of animals and their products. Broadly, transactional inter-
ventions involve regulation and legislative control
(e.g. https://www.nfacc.ca/codes-of-practice), and tracking
and detection of products as they move through the supply
chain, and these can be applied during transit or sale. Here
we present a series of options varying in the strength of
restrictions.
(a) Reduce disease transmission risk during transport
• Ban the long-distance and/or cross-border transport of
high-risk species, or increase enforcement and penalties
for these activities if they are already restricted.
• Restrict the long-distance transport of high-risk species by
using species quotas, licensing traders, or export
certification.
• Ban the international transport of live wild animals except
for licenced conservation and scientific programmes.
• Minimise international transport of live livestock and
introduce detailed health status checks.
• Improve awareness of laws and penalties for the transport
of high-risk species at transit stations (e.g. displays at air-
ports and seaports), and on board international transport
services (e.g. announcements on aeroplanes, ships and
trains).
• Improve detection of wild-caught high-risk species by
building capacity for local enforcement officers and cus-
toms regulators to identify regulated species and derivative
products (e.g. visually, or using forensic traceability
methods such as DNA barcoding, stable isotope analysis)
to check source and species are as reported.
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• Introduce mandatory quarantine for all exported live wild-
life and domestic animals to destination countries to pre-
vent diseases crossing borders.
• Ban species mixing and introduce measures to decrease
animal stress during (i) live animal transport and/or (ii) at
trade consolidation points after collecting.
• Improve enforcement of safety and hygiene standards dur-
ing transit by training local enforcement and customs reg-
ulators in the legal requirements for transporting high-risk
species.
• Apply whole-supply-chain traceability methods
(e.g. tamper-proof boxes, electronic tags, physical marking
with barcodes, blockchain) to show that shipments have
undergone quarantine/pathogen detection/disinfection
at each step.
• Introduce technology-based reporting systems to trace dis-
ease outbreaks to source, including in domestic animal
farms.
• Introduce licencing or certification systems for the trans-
port of live animals or animal parts, to ensure adherence
to hygiene and welfare standards.
• Avoid transportation of (i) different domestic species, (ii)
both wildlife and domestic animals, and (iii) animals from
different sources, in the same cages and/or vehicles to pre-
vent disease transmission among live animals during
transit.
• Regulate maximum allowed animal density for animals
simultaneously housed or transported.
• Introduce standards for regular checking and safe removal
of dead or sick individuals during transport, including their
bedding materials.
• Build the capacity of airport, seaport, border and cargo
personnel for safe, secure and scientific handling of wildlife
and domestic animals and animal products during transit
checks.
• Introduce safe and hygienic animal handling and slaughter
standards (e.g. for waste disposal of slaughter by-products),
and training for licensed processors of both live animals
and animal products (e.g. tannery and wool industries).
• Increase verification checks at critical control points in the
trade chain, and verify stocks present against inventories in
central databases.
(b) Reduce disease risks during slaughtering, processing and
at place of sale
• Identify and introduce bans on sales of high-risk species
and products.
• Establish or increase penalties for sales of high-risk species.
• Introduce a licencing or certification system for any vendor
or processor of live animals or animal parts, with regular
checks and training, to ensure laws and standards are
adhered to and that quotas can be monitored.
• Ensure all places of sale that deal with live animals, raw
meat or animal parts have standardised sanitary control
measures and regular inspections.
• Introduce mandatory pasteurisation methods for raw ani-
mal products from non-domesticated animals (e.g. for tra-
ditional medicine or food).
• Introduce mandatory separation at markets or shops
between live animals of different species, between live
domesticated and wild animals, and between live animals
and animal parts.
• Introduce laws to prevent consumption of raw animal
products (e.g. raw meat in restaurants, raw animal parts
used in traditional medicine).
• Enhance hygiene standards, such as daily disinfection of
market environments, and traders’ vehicles and
equipment.
• Introduce legal requirements for quarantine control of live
animal movements in markets selling wild animals
and meat.
• Establish set maximal prices for specific high-risk wildlife
products to influence both supply and demand for that
product.
• Introduce mandatory separation of animals and derivative
products from different sources, thus any contamination is
limited to single products and sources rather than dis-
persed throughout entire trade chain of harvests.
• Ensure that trade hygiene standards for wild animals
match those for livestock.
• Increase awareness of laws and penalties for trade of high-
risk species at places of sale (e.g. posters at known wildlife
markets).
• Build enforcement capacity and forensic accounting ability
to audit marketplaces and vendors.
• Increase enforcement, monitoring and detection for all
wildlife trade, including for banned species, separation of
animals and hygiene.
• Enable easy anonymous modes of reporting of wildlife for
sale or violations of restrictions in hygiene regulations,
e.g. through reporting hotlines etc., and make such rules
widely visible.
• Keep premises free of animals between events (e.g. 27 days
in the UK: Animal Gatherings Order, 2010) where ani-
mals are brought together (e.g. live animal shows, whole-
sale or retail markets) to allow sufficient time to disinfect
between uses.
• Burn or otherwise appropriately dispose of used or soiled
bedding and other waste.
• Ensure that water, including from fish and amphibian
tanks, goes into drainage facilities for treatment and not
directly into water courses.
• Introduce mandatory testing (additional screening of viral
pathogens in high-risk taxa or those utilised in high vol-
umes) and health surveillance of species considered for
human consumption or use.
(3) Consumption
Demand-side interventions can reduce the frequency or the
quantity of a given high-risk product being used or shift
demand away from high-risk products and towards lower risk
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ones (UNEP, 2019). These interventions can take the form of
either coercive measures, such as laws or law enforcement
aimed at dictating consumer behaviour, or closer engage-
ment with consumers to identify interventions that promote
voluntary behaviour change (’tSas-Rolfes et al., 2019).
Demand-side measures can target consumers directly or indi-
rectly, through the use of key influencers such as peers, doc-
tors, or religious leaders (’tSas-Rolfes et al., 2019).
(a) Coercive measures to change consumer demand
These include interventions of a legal nature that aim to reg-
ulate purchase and consumption behaviours.
• Ban the purchase, sale, possession or use of high-risk
products.
• Establish or increase penalties for the purchase, sale or use
of high-risk products.
• Improve enforcement of regulations around purchase or
use to increase perceived risk of penalties for sellers and
consumers breaking the law.
• Increase consumer awareness of regulations and related
penalties of illegal purchase or use of high-risk products.
(b) Promoting voluntary behaviour change in consumers
Opportunities exist to encourage behaviour change among
consumers given the enhanced awareness of the risks of trade
in high-risk animal species and various types of animal farm-
ing as well increased concern of current environmental chal-
lenges, including biodiversity loss. Progress is likely to entail
engagement with consumers to develop a shared understand-
ing of drivers of demand and potential barriers to change,
along with co-development of interventions based around
voluntary behaviour change (Verissimo et al., 2020). Engage-
ment of key influencers may be critical, with the most appropri-
ate figure types (e.g. local leaders) varying across demographic
and psychographic consumer groups.
Further interventions that could affect demand include an
increase in the costs of purchasing or consuming high-risk
products or an increase in the benefits of purchasing or con-
suming lower-risk products, while preserving consumer
choice. These include outreach campaigns aimed at influenc-
ing social norms and consumer behaviour, economic incen-
tives and improved access to substitutes (Chaves et al., 2018;
Wicander & Coad, 2018; Salazar et al., 2019) and can target
both traditional information channels as well as social media,
especially when target audiences are very active online.
While all of these ideas have been discussed in the literature
for decades, the evidence base around their effectiveness is
still sparse (Wicander & Coad, 2018; Verissimo &
Wan, 2019). The mainstreaming of social media and other
digital communication platforms opens up new avenues for
interventions to manage demand for wildlife products, such
as the use of online advertising to reach consumers
(Doughty et al., 2020).
• Influence social norms to reduce social acceptability of the
purchase, possession or use of high-risk animals and prod-
ucts, including as pets.
• Promote the development and commercialisation of syn-
thetic alternatives (e.g. synthetic fur, leather or
laboratory-created meat).
• Influence consumer attitudes to increase acceptability of
lower-risk substitute products (e.g. plants or synthetic sub-
stitutes for food, clothing or medicine instead of animal
products, particularly those from high-risk species).
• Tax high-risk products in order to decrease the financial
gains of trading such products.
• Subsidise or lower taxes on lower-risk substitutes of high-
risk products (e.g. certified captive-bred disease-free prod-
ucts, use of different species or plant/synthetic material
instead of wild animals), to reduce the relative financial
cost of purchasing substitutes.
• Increase the availability of lower-risk substitutes of high-
risk products at the points of sale most relevant to con-
sumers of high-risk products.
• Increase knowledge of the existence and availability of
lower-risk products that can act as substitutes to high-risk
products and guide consumer choice towards such
products.
• Develop certification systems for high-value species that
cannot be removed from trade but for which laundering
of wild individuals, and thus disease transmission, remains
a risk.
• Increase recognition and trust of certification schemes
amongst consumers of high-risk products.
(4) Enabling environment (applies to all)
(a) Capacity
Increase effectiveness of animal health, enforcement and cus-
toms workers (e.g. by increasing numbers, motivation, train-
ing and equipment of custom officers, focusing enforcement
on key airports and seaports, and tackling corruption).
• Create markets for sustainable/low-risk products and
certification.
• Streamline collaboration among agencies to develop and
enforce trade regulations.
• Introduce training of relevant agencies within
government.
• Increase effectiveness and independence of the legal
system.
• Involve community in justice initiatives that improve
transparency and enforcement.
• Provide amnesty in exchange for cessation and/or infor-
mation for tackling illegal or sanctionable activities con-
cerning animal health and zoonotic risk.
• Ensure appropriate biosafety level of all educational and
research laboratories dealing with samples and pathogens.
• Increase capacity of all laboratories dealing with animal
samples to include trade forensics.
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• Improve zoonotic disease surveillance and public health
preparedness.
• Provide simple tests [e.g. Rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs)] to
be used on farms for high-risk zoonotic pathogens and
which can be applied without expert skills (i.e. by the
farmer).
• Build capacity of law enforcement officials for identifica-
tion of regulated species and standards, and rescue and
release of wildlife where appropriate and safe.
(b) Government commitments
• Ensure international multilateral agreements are fit for
purpose.
• Increase governmental buy-in/backing for trade
agreements.
• Increase the number of countries signed up to multilateral
agreements.
• Ensure clear screening and checks for all meat and animal
products.
• Increase multi-agency collaboration within countries to
strengthen law enforcement against wildlife criminals.
• Increase trans-boundary collaboration to dismantle crimi-
nal networks and product flows in international markets.
• Establish hygiene and safety standards at critical control
points, such as developing safe and hygienic animal han-
dling and slaughter guidelines and cleanliness standards.
• Ensure legislative framework and prosecutorial capacity
for enforcing regulations.
• Tackle wider criminal networks involved in illegal wildlife
trade including empowering the media, reducing corrup-
tion, prosecuting corrupt officials and rewarding and pro-
tecting whistleblowers.
• Financially support the provision and installation of ade-
quate storage facilities for food and farm produce to min-
imise contacts with wildlife and their excreta.
V. DISCUSSION
(1) Using options to make decisions
COVID-19 has demonstrated the rapid capacity of a virus to
transform human lives globally. In an interconnected world
such events cause mass mortality and overload health sys-
tems, yet without systemic change the rate of emergence of
zoonotic diseases with pandemic potential will continue to
increase and we need to learn lessons not only on how
to moderate and control pandemics post-emergence, but to
minimise the risk of their emergence by reducing the likeli-
hood of animal–human disease spillover. To cause spillover
infections in humans, all zoonotic pathogens must overcome
a hierarchical series of barriers. Understanding and targeting
these barriers (e.g. via integrating studies of animal ecology,
landscape ecology, microbiology, disease ecology, immunol-
ogy and others) could substantially improve our ability to
predict or prevent spillover events, for instance by reducing
human exposure (Plowright et al., 2017).
We herein present a list of options, not conservation or sus-
tainability focused, but specifically to achieve a reduced risk
of disease transmission from animals to humans. These are
not reactive strategies for use during a disease outbreak, but
a set of proactive options to change the way society currently
operates and to prevent disease emergence in humans at the
outset. These options can be used in the design of strategies to
minimise risks of zoonotic disease transfer by inter-govern-
mental, governmental, corporate or non-governmental orga-
nisations or individuals. We emphasise that our solution scan
does not provide a list of recommendations or prescriptions.
It instead provides a starting point for discussion and analysis
of the available options for intervention with different
decision-making and regulation bodies at global, regional,
national and local scales.
When deciding on which measures should be adopted,
policy-makers and practitioners should first determine the
context, the pathways of zoonotic disease transfer to be
addressed and the risks associated with them. This will then
allow relevant and practical options to be prioritised, assessed
and tested. Once this has occurred, decisions can be made on
which interventions to deploy, feeding into strategies to
reduce the risks of zoonotic disease transfer.
(a) Identifying risks
Our solution scan considers a wide range of threats and
potential pathways of disease transmission, but it should be
noted that these pathways will, in practice, have different
levels of risk associated with them. Based on the results of risk
assessments, specific interventions may be more or less appli-
cable and important for different reservoir species, types of
disease, transmission pathways or socio-ecological contexts.
Where a specific risk is being considered, a policy-maker will
be required to choose those options that are relevant to their
context and to discount those that are not appropriate or
may be harmful. Importantly, focusing solely on a set of
options, for instance dealing with livestock systems, will not
reduce the substantial risks that are related to emerging dis-
eases from wildlife; thus priorities and context are critical.
Decision-makers, regulatory bodies and organisations
involved with monitoring or guiding trade, international
movement, or environmental policy (e.g. CITES, WTO,
various national health, trade, agriculture and environment
agencies) should therefore begin identifying transmission
pathways for disease(s) that are to be tackled, the
pathogen(s) of interest and the levels of risk associated with
each pathway. In addition, private sector companies that
facilitate the trade of animals (e.g. airlines: https://
routespartnership.org/) should work closely with regulators
to identify and address gaps and vulnerabilities in enforce-
ment and regulation that may lead to the spread of disease
(e.g. illegal wildlife trade via domestic flights:
Utermohlen, 2020). Doing so will help determine which
groups of interventions should be assessed. For example,
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many of the interventions in the list above focus on high-
intensity farming systems, and thus selecting appropriate
interventions will necessarily have to adapt to the farming
systems present and the potential for interactions between
wildlife and livestock, as well as transmission of novel patho-
gens between other livestock and humans. Interdisciplinary
engagement, such as between biomedical researchers and
invasion scientists, can offer novel insights and approaches
for the modelling, risk assessment, monitoring and man-
agement of future zoonoses (Ogden et al., 2019; Nuñez,
Pauchard & Ricciard, 2020).
(b) Assessment, review and testing
Once context and transmission pathways have been assessed,
the long list of options presented above can be scanned, and
candidate options selected based on their relevance and prac-
ticality. Deciding on their use will require consideration of a
wide range of variables including evidence of effectiveness,
cost, practicality, equity/fairness, social acceptability and
the interventions already in place.
Ideally effectiveness and possible harms of an intervention
(both for reducing zoonotic disease transfer, and other off-
target effects) would be assessed using robust evidence from
the scientific literature including systematic reviews
(Donnelly et al., 2018) and subject-wide evidence synthesis
(Sutherland et al., 2019). However, in many cases it is likely
that the evidence base is lacking. In these instances, expert
experience and knowledge (Sutherland & Burgmann, 2015)
should be used to assess likely effects and harms and make
pragmatic decisions. Where evidence is lacking, careful test-
ing of interventions is important to promote learning and
prevent harmful or unintended consequences.
(c) Cost–benefit and trade-offs
The costs of these interventions should also be assessed,
including not just the direct costs of an intervention but also
changes in future income (opportunity costs) to different
stakeholder groups. Further, it is important to consider
equity in decision-making. The costs and benefits of an inter-
vention may not be borne equally by all members of society,
or all stakeholder groups. For example, an intervention to
ban the hunting of wild animals may detrimentally impact
indigenous peoples and local communities who rely on that
resource, whilst bearing minimal costs to other stakeholders.
(d) Choosing interventions/developing and modifying
strategies
Using the relevant options identified (Step a) and an assess-
ment of their feasibility, benefits and harms (Step b), practi-
tioners and policy makers can create strategies for tackling
the transmission pathways of interest. Strategies can involve
a combination of measures tackling different environments
and pathways of disease transmission. Where possible,
actions should be carefully monitored after implementation
to ensure they are achieving intended outcomes, whilst
avoiding unintended off-target harms.
(2) High-level options currently proposed in the
response to COVID-19
There have been numerous calls for radical changes, primar-
ily for complete bans on hunting, wildlife trade, wildlife trade
for consumption or so-called ‘wet markets’. Such calls may
sound reasonable but miss the important roles of fisheries
and sustainable products, wildlife’s contribution to global
diets and that wet markets are an important source of afford-
able fresh produce, where wildlife generally has a minor role
(Ribeiro et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2020).
Whilst acknowledging the need and appetite for change,
we believe such broad measures are unlikely to be enacted
or obeyed. The solution seems likely to be a broader, more
pragmatic and realistic approach that considers the variety
of disease pathways, the different mechanisms by which
interventions can act, the complexity of options that can tar-
get such mechanisms and the likely on- and off-target effects
of those actions. This solution scan can help in the early
stages of designing such approaches, presenting a wide range
of options, including stronger enforcement on illegal wildlife
trade and bans on high-risk wildlife trade, which can be con-
sidered to tackle the transfer of emerging zoonotic diseases
with epidemic potential into humans.
VI. FURTHER UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
To help set an agenda for future research we have collabora-
tively identified 10 important questions. These questions
were identified by the authors following the construction of
the lists in Section III and relate to unanswered questions
around implementation and effectiveness that arose during
the solution scan.
(1) What are the most cost-effective ways of achieving
long-term consumer behaviour change, particularly
in areas where the use of high-risk wildlife species
(e.g. bats, rodents, primates or other species identified
as high risk for disease transmission) is deeply cultur-
ally embedded?
(2) What are the most cost-effective ways for protecting
natural habitat areas that harbour high-risk species
and for reducing contact of such species with
humans?
(3) What are the most cost-effective measures to prevent
contact between wildlife and livestock or farmed
wildlife in different settings?
(4) For small-scale livestock kept in/under houses with
human residents how can disease transmission risks
be minimised, or can we find central communal
alternatives?
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(5) How can adequate standards for hygiene and health
of farm animals be applied in LMICs given the lack
of infrastructure, the need for trained personnel and
the increased production costs?
(6) Is there any disease risk associated with animal dung
used for cooking or building materials and, if so,
would simple treatments be effective for sterilisation?
(7) For wildlife farming facilities (e.g. fur farming) how
can prevention of laundering of wildstock be ensured
cost effectively?
(8) In LMIC where wild meat is both a subsistence liveli-
hood and core food supply, would restricting con-
sumption of meat to ‘low-risk’ species be sufficient
to minimise disease risk, does risk vary over the
annual cycle so that hunting should be limited to cer-
tain periods, and how can we understand relative risk
in such situations?
(9) How can we manage natural systems to maintain
healthy wild populations and reduce the chance of
spillover due to host immunosuppression?
(10) When are the key times of year where, due to natural
stressors, spillover events are more likely, and how
can such periods and the areas where they occur be
avoided?
VII. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
To understand which activities risk zoonotic emergence and
spread and how they should be changed to minimise the risk
of future zoonotic spill-over events requires a joined-up
approach that combines expertise across a range of social,
environmental, veterinary and medical sciences. Such a
holistic approach to environmental sustainability, livestock
health and human health combined is often termed ‘One-
Health’ (https://www.cdc.gov/onehealth/index.html), and
aims to understand how environmental health influences
spillover probability, and to act to reduce those impacts
and therefore risk. There is a pressing need to unite research
investigating public health and domestic animal health
threats from wildlife, but also to link this with the biodiversity
crisis and improve our understanding of the drivers of envi-
ronmental change and how these lead to disease emergence
and pandemic threat (Dobson et al., 2020).
Our list is a starting point for collating the evidence, iden-
tifying research gaps and building policies. We need further
research into the potential sources of zoonotic diseases, risks
of different transmission pathways and the effectiveness of
different measures. The appropriateness of different mea-
sures will vary depending according to the scale of the oper-
ation and the extent to which it can be regulated. As just one
example, measures for markets depend on whether electricity
is widespread or whether animals need to be purchased live
and killed before cooking to keep meat fresh. Although some
intensive livestock systems are highly controlled and biosafety
measures well researched, less work has been done in less-
intensive systems, or in parts of the world where standards
may be lower or less rigorously enforced. Ensuring that
appropriate biosafety is implemented at all levels and intensi-
ties, and developing provisions to ensure biosafety protocols
are followed through supply chains, is critical to creating a
robust future society.
Furthermore, reducing the opportunities for zoonotic dis-
eases to transmit into captive animals or humans requires fur-
ther work both to reduce the risk of exposure and to manage
landscapes effectively to reduce the chance of spillover events
occurring.
In addition to human impacts, epidemics resulting from
zoonotic diseases have been a major cause of wild species
population declines, thus understanding how to reduce trans-
mission at all scales is key for both human health and wildlife
conservation. Our need for animal companions, and for the
products generated by animal rearing, therefore requires suf-
ficient safeguards at low costs and at all scales, although this
may be especially challenging to enact in LMICs where the
risk of transmission due to proximity to wildlife and captive
animals may be high, hygiene conditions poor, and veteri-
nary screening challenging or inaccessible.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
(1) The COVID-19 pandemic alerted the world to the
serious nature of pandemics and created demand for
change. As a consequence, there have been calls for,
and debates around the relative merits of, the banning
of international trade of wild animals. However whilst
the current debate has focussed on the consumption of
wild animals in south-east Asia, evidence from the
emergence of other zoonotic pathogens suggests that
transmission pathways are diverse and we also need
to address disease emergence risks from (i) direct con-
tact with and use of wild animals and their products
(e.g. wild meat hunting), (ii) the export and commercial
trade of wild animal products, (iii) the breeding, rear-
ing and trade of wild animals, and (iv) the breeding,
rearing and trade of domesticated animals. Although
not tackled herein, zoonotic pathogens can also
emerge from (v) the evolution of AMR, (vi) pathogen
release or escape from laboratories, including bioter-
rorism, or perhaps even (vii) the intentional creation
of life.
(2) Given the diversity of possible transmission pathways,
and the complexity of the socio-ecological systems in
which interventions are to be put in place to reduce
risk, single interventions may not address the pathways
of highest risk, and may create unintended, difficult-to-
predict outcomes. To design the most feasible and
effective strategies for reducing the likelihood of zoo-
notic disease outbreaks and for predicting and pre-
venting future pandemics, it is necessary to take a
holistic, context-specific, systems-based approach and
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work collaboratively across borders and disciplines.
Strategies will need to implement a package of mea-
sures, tackling multiple transmission pathways of
greatest risk, with actions assessed and monitored as
to their effectiveness and feasibility.
(3) Our solution scan has identified 161 options for reduc-
ing the risk of emergence which can serve as a starting
point in the design of such holistic strategies. Further
work should be undertaken on transmission pathways
not tackled herein to identify options that could reduce
the likelihood of disease emergence.
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Hoffmann, B., Tappe, D., Höper, D., Herden, C., Boldt, A., Mawrin, C.,
Niederstraßer, O., Müller, T., Jenckel, M., van der Griten, E.,
Lutter, C., Abendroth, B., Teifke, J. P., Cadar, D., Schmidt-
Chanasit, J., et al. (2015). A variegated squirrel bornavirus associated with fatal
human encephalitis. New England Journal of Medicine 373, 154–162.
Hovi, M., Mcleod, A. & Gunn, G. (2005). Assessing UK farmer attitudes to
biosecurity on sheep and cattle farms. Research in Veterinary Science 78, 24.
Huang, Z., Whelan, C. V., Foley, N. M., Jebb, D., Touzalin, F., Petit, E. J.,
Puechmaille, S. J. & Teeling, E. C. (2019). Longitudinal comparative
transcriptomics reveals unique mechanisms underlying extended healthspan in
bats. Nature Ecology & Evolution 3, 1110–1120.
Huang, Z. Y., Yu, Y., van Langevelde, F. & de Boer, W. F. (2017).
Does the dilution effect generally occur in animal diseases? Parasitology 144,
823–826.
Huber, N., Canoine, V., Cornils, J. S., Maggini, I., Cardinale, M., Ruf, T. &
Fusani, L. (2020). Leukocyte coping capacity as a complementary stress metric in
migrating birds. Journal of Ornithology 161, 909–913.
Islam, M., Sazzad, H., Satter, S., Sultana, S., Hossain, M., Hasan, M.,
Rahman, M., Campbell, S., Cannon, D. L., Ströher, U., Daszak, P.,
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